Different things happened in New York to what Christofias says

President Christofias’ statements in Cyprus and even are in stark contrast to what actually happened in New York and to what the UN S-G himself said, according to Makarios Droushiotis writing in Politis.

Even in his briefing of the National Council he referred to things that hadn’t even been discussed, and when asked to submit the convergences in writing to the Council he refused for fear of leaks.

According to reliable sources, he says that the UN S-G’s statement after the talks, which was approved by both leaders, is the only reliable description of the New York meetings and the only one that binds them.

The government tried to put a different spin on the UN S-G’s statements by claiming he had described the talks more optimistically than events prescribed and that when he talked of “encouraging progress” he just meant that the two sides understood each other’s positions.

A source that is fully informed as to what actually transpired at the talks told the writer that these interpretations are “sophistries” used to serve the needs of the political game being played in Cyprus.

The source said that the UN S-G said exactly what he meant and the Security Council supported this by saying that it is convinced that a solution is possible and that all that is needed is political will.

The source added that to some extent such political shenanigans are understandable in the internal game being played but the talks have now entered an extremely serious phase to be faced with such tactics.

Moreover, the source said, it’s worrisome that not only are false interpretations being made, but information is being leaked that does not correspond with reality.

One such example, the source said, was when President Christofias told the National Council, as was leaked in the press, that Ban Ki-moon was annoyed with Eroglu over the issue of the weighted vote. Apparently Christofias didn’t even raise such an issue and nor did he withdraw his proposal for rotating presidency. This was one of the more positive developments from the talks, and besides nor was the question of the weighted vote even discussed. In fact in his summing up the UN S-G said there were two proposals on the table as regards elections for the executive as follows:
- Christofias’ proposal for separate election for the first term of government and rotating presidency on a 4:1 ratio. Automatic adoption of weighted for the second term
- Eroglu’s proposal for separate elections for the first term and rotating presidency on a 7:3 ratio. Weighted voting in the second term provided it is approved by the Senate.

The differences are not unbridgeable and it was agreed to finish the discussion in Cyprus. Agreement was almost reached on the question of citizenship, while on the property issue it was agreed that the owner of the property would have first say provided that he lived in the property in 1974. Compensation will be given to inheritors.

The writer goes on to say that Western diplomats, who were briefed by the UN as to what happened at the talks, are puzzled by Christofias’ statements that nothing whatsoever happened in New York and that nothing is expected to happen in January either, and are trying to find explanations. If this is all for internal consumption, they wonder, how is he going to win the people over if there is agreement at Greentree 2? If he is afraid of reactions and is just wasting time, what will he do in January when time is up? Or perhaps he truly believes what he says, and if so, then maybe he has a problem of comprehension, agreeing on one thing and understanding something totally different.

Equally unfounded are Christofias’ statements that there will be other meetings with the UN S-G after the January meeting, and that the option also exists to freeze the procedure till after the elections. If anything was made absolutely clear in New York, it was that this is the endgame. Christofias told the S-G that only he can solve the Cyprus problem and complained bitterly about the opposition, particularly about Anastasiades’ transformation and that he would prefer that everything is over before an international conference so that there are no leftovers for the next President. It was in this context that he said he would not be sitting opposite them in 2013.

Despite the fact that it is clear that after New York the procedure is reaching its climax and one would expect that the climate would improve over the next few months, on the contrary what is actually happening is that the blame game is climaxing. According to information, the Turkish side has sent all of Eroglu’s statement and all of Christofias’ statements to Alexander Downer and asked him to compare them in an effort to show evidence for bad will on the part of the Greek Cypriot side in the event of failure at Greentree 2.

An editorial in the Mail on Sunday refers to an interview with former Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat who said that his friend President Christofias wanted a Cyprus settlement, “but he was a coward”, being afraid of his government alliance partners. The paper says this cowardice has been evident through most of the Christofias presidency, which has been singularly unable to deal decisively with any of the big issues it has faced. In these three-and-a-half years, Christofias has exhibited most of the traits of weak leadership from fear of taking unpopular decisions to abrogation of responsibility and hyper-sensitivity to criticism. On the Cyprus talks, his cowardice may have served him well, as the majority of the Greek Cypriots do not seem very keen on a settlement, but the do-nothing approach on public finances has led us to the brink of disaster. We just hope that in a few months’ time defenders of Christofias would not be using a variation of Talat’s observation – he wanted to save the economy but he was a coward.