Cyprus endgame

The Acting Deputy Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General Farhan Haq announced yesterday that the UN Secretary-General will host the two Cypriot leaders in a working lunch on Thursday, 18 November, followed by a meeting in the afternoon.

An editorial in the Financial Times says that Sir David Hannay, an eminent British diplomat, once observed that no one had ever lost money betting against a successful outcome of negotiations to solve the Cyprus problem. As a former UK special representative for Cyprus, he knew whereof he spoke. The latest United Nations-sponsored talks, which started in 2008, have not even come close to ending the division of Cyprus, now in its 37th year. But the process is approaching a T-junction at which it will no longer be possible to avoid choosing between a settlement and the island’s permanent partition.

If, as seems entirely likely, the discussions in New York this week lead nowhere, the UN may withdraw from its good offices mission, raising the prospect of formal partition.

A two-state solution is not an ideal outcome. It would impose grave costs on the Greek Cypriots in terms of maintaining high levels of military expenditure to counter the perceived Turkish threat. In the short term, it would deal yet another blow to Turkey’s prospects of joining the European Union.

But to varying degrees each Cypriot community has only itself to blame. For too long, Greek Cypriots have mouthed platitudes in support of reunifying Cyprus, while never taking the politically difficult decisions needed for a breakthrough. The Turkish Cypriots did at least vote in favour of a settlement in 2004. But Mr Eroglu has long favoured a two-state solution – as did Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader from 1983 to 2005. As Alexander Downer, the UN envoy for Cyprus, put it earlier this year: “It’s easy to sound in favour of a solution ... You can train a parrot in a pet shop to say that.”

If the Turkish Cypriots asked for recognition of their state, it would be difficult for the UK to oblige, because London is bound by a 1960 treaty of guarantee not to promote partition. Other EU countries would also hesitate. But many states are impatient with the constant Greek Cypriot disruption of EU business on account of the Cyprus dispute. They believe Turkey’s rising geopolitical and economic importance makes it imperative to show Ankara that the EU will not be hostage to the Greek Cypriots for ever. Even Russia, a long-time friend of the Greek Cypriots, is signalling a possible change of course on account of its newly blossoming ties with Turkey. The isolation of the Turkish Cypriots may therefore not last much longer – a point the Greek Cypriots should bear in mind before letting the UN talks fail.

A former US ambassador to Greece in a letter to the FT says that the EU effectively lost its leverage on Cyprus in 2004 when it allowed itself to be blackmailed by Greece, which threatened to block the admission of the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Malta, unless Cyprus was admitted too.

He said that while he was serving in Greece in 1995, he had worked with the French EU presidency to devise a formula whereby Cyprus Cyprus’ admission to the EU would come only after a settlement had been reached. In other words, the EU would admit a Cyprus settlement, not the Cyprus problem.

In giving in to Greece’s blackmail, he said, the EU effectively threw away its leverage and ensured that a Cyprus settlement would probably never be reached. It also, in effect, rewarded the Papadopoulos government for having killed the Annan Plan, which was the best hope for a solution to the Cyprus problem.