1. Campaign costs
Research by Gnora Consultants into the money the various candidates spent on their election campaigns revealed that all three spent a total of €4.4 million. The Papadopoulos camp spent the most, despite the fact that his campaign lasted a week less than that of his opponents. He was the only candidate who reserved advertising space in newspapers for the Monday after the first election Sunday.

2. What the Sunday papers say
Loucas Charalambous writing in the Mail and Politis explains that the bickering over the pharase ‘virgin birth’ is whether, in the event of a settlement, the new federal state would evolve from the Cyprus Republic or come into being as something completely new. He says it was all because of Christofias' rhetoric that the Annan plan was dead, that the only way forward was the July 8 agreement, that he would never accept Turkish guarantees, etc. that made Talat bring it up. The Turkish Cypriot position is that all these matters had been resolved by the Annan plan, and only through negotiations based on that plan could any changes be discussed. So every time our leadership utters the familiar slogans, the Turkish Cypriot leadership repeats its own and we will never finish.What is annoying is the hypocrisy of AKEL. Christofias has no right to be beating his breast today over the proposed virgin birth and at the same time hypocritically curse Glafcos Clerides for rejecting the Set of Ideas which suggested the virgin birth in the first place. What's more, on a range of serious issues, such as guarantees and the presence of troops, the provisions of the Set of Ideas were much worse than the ‘cursed’ Annan plan which Christofias detests so much and was lambasting Clerides and Kasoulides for contributing to its conception (not immaculately, it must be said).

Coffeeshop in the Sunday Mail raves about the warm welcome and red carpet treatment Christofias got in Brussels. EU leaders treated our Comrade Presidente with the sort of fawning respect and deference usually reserved for personalities with the world stature of Nelson Mandela. Not that he has really done anything to deserve it. Alright, Comrade Christofias did cause the overthrow of a petty tyrant, albeit by democratic means, but he did not rid humanity of a Ceausescu or Saddam. Our deposed Ethnarch may have had a mean streak but he was a cuddly pussycat compared to those two. And our European comrades should not forget that the man they were giving the Mandela welcome to on Thursday and Friday for toppling the benign tyrant, was guilty of making him Ethnarch five years ago. But do they care? Of course not, because the view in Brussels, since the referendum, was that anyone would be better to deal with than Tassos – even an unrepentant communist of the Soviet school, who remains a big fan of Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez, detests the West and abhors the capitalist values of the EU, which he believes is run by multi-national corporations hell-bent on exploiting workers and imposing the new world order.
As for the romance developing between our government and the UK this raised a few eyebrows, considering it was comrade presidente who had referred to Britain, not so long ago as “our bad demon”. The only plausible explanation is that he has renounced Greek Orthodoxy and taken up Satan-worship since being elected. Brown even went to our man’s hotel suite for a meeting. The duplicitous, conniving, back-stabbing ‘bad demon’ is clearly up to something, because this shameless buttering up of our presidente cannot be attributed, exclusively, to his assurances that he would not raise the issue of the bases. The million dollar question is why is he responding so positively to the ‘bad demon’s’ flirtation? The embracing of Satan worship is the only explanation.Andreas Theophanous, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Nicosia and Director of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs writing in the Sunday Mail and Politis refers to an article by J. Muller in a recent issue of the prestigious American journal Foreign Affairs relating it to the Cyprus problem. He says according to Muller there are two major approaches on which collective/national identities are based. First, the liberal approach which emphasises a common value system and includes all citizens in a state irrespective of their ethnic or racial background, language and/or religion (eg as in America). Second, ethnonationalism, based on common heritage, ethnic identity, language, history and usually religion, which promotes the cohesion of states but at the same time may lead to conflictual in bi-ethnic and multi-ethnic states (most common across the world, including Europe). Muller says that the vicious circle of ethnonationalistic conflicts within states is not over and predicts that the 21st century will be characterised by such conflicts. Given such circumstances, opting for partition may be the least painful solution. On the other hand, the author points out that the promotion of a liberal approach and of civic nationalism may prevent or contain conflict and, in the long run, provide added stability. Theophanous says most of the ideas and settlement blueprints that have been proposed over the years for Cyprus are based on ethnonationalistic criteria and have generated strong reactions. Suffice to say that the Ghali Set of Ideas and the 2004 UN Plan were considered, at least by most Greek Cypriots, worse than the 1960 Constitution, which collapsed leading to inter-ethnic violence and subsequently to today’s status quo. If, therefore, these constitutional arrangements are to be implemented in Cyprus, they would, most likely, lead to more problems than those they seek to resolve. He says federal models which are founded exclusively on the premise of ethnonationalism have a higher probability of failure than success. On the other hand, federal models that respect ethnic communities as well as individual rights, while revolving around the concept of civic nationalism and a common core value system, have greater chances of success. If these arguments are correct, we need to be very critical of any plan for Cyprus formulated exclusively on the premises of ethnonationalism, since it will lead to a failure with unpredictable consequences. While the political leadership has the best intensions in promoting the reunification of the island, it is also important to take into consideration the different philosophical approaches as well as relevant experiences from elsewhere. Indeed, it is paramount to understand the dilemmas faced by bi-ethnic and multi-ethnic societies since good intentions alone do not constitute a sufficient enough precondition for the success of any political action.In conclusion, the re-establishment of the unity of the economy, society, territory and of the state in Cyprus can only be promoted through an integrationalist federal model, which, while it would respect bi-communality, would not exclusively depend on it. Whatever has been proposed so far creates those conditions for the kind of conflicts that J. Muller predicts will consume global politics for generations to come.
Giorgos Kaskanis writing in Politis predicts that a new version version of the 8 July agreement and confidence building measures will emerge from the Christofias-Talat meeting. Quoting diplomatic circles, he says that the international community has a two-pronged strategy. The first is a new version of the 8 July agreement and are positive towards Christofias position to set up committees but would like them to have a specific time frame of about 3 months. After that the procedure should enter a more substantive phase with direct negotiations between the two leaders. The second revolves around the discussion and implementation of confidence-building measures between the two sides that will not just restrict themselves to the opening of the road blocks but would extend to areas that would make the two communities feel there really was a desire for a solution.

Makarios Droushiotis in Politis says the EU is impressed with Christofias and is eager to take advantage of the new climate and push for a solution to the Cyprus problem. With Erdogan at the helm in Turkey and despite letters and statements as to the kind of solution Turkey envisages, it seems the Turkish government is willing to solve the Cyprus problem irrespective of its EU entry course. However, a dampener has been put on proceedings he says by a political crisis developing in Turkey which, while on the surface seem to be unconnected to the Cyprus problem, may ultimately hamper efforts towards a solution, if it results in the fall of the most moderate Turkish government to date and will set the country many years back. He says today Cyprus is a thorn in the EU's side in four areas.
1. The EU's relations with Nato, especially as regards peace-keeping missions eg Turkey blocked Nato's policing of Kosovo because of the participation of Cyprus
2. Turkey's entry course and the hampering of the work of the Enlargement Committee, which spends most of its time to solving complications arising from the Cyprus problem, in that anything that has to do with Turkey's entry comes up against Cyprus. The committee moreover was furious with the suits filed by Tassos more so because he didn't consult with Brussels in advance as regulations provide. Already Marcos Kyprianou at his meeting with Ollie Rehn has agreed to withdraw them and for the Committee ot introduce certain corrective measures.
3. The Green Line is an open wound for the EU especially as regards illegal immigrants, although for the time being this only affects the island. Cyprus is the only country of the ten that were admitted in 2004 where the Treaty of Schengen is not applied but this cannot go on for ever.
4. The status of the Buffer Zone which risks bringing Turkey into conflict with the EU.

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